# AMLR / AMLD6 / AMLA implementation pathway tracker

AMLR Regulation (EU) 2024/1624, AMLD6 Directive (EU) 2024/1640 and AMLA Regulation Article 12 define whether EU/EEA obliged entities, including CASPs, remain under NCA/FIU supervision or move toward AMLA direct supervision. The tracker maps 111 nodes and 343 edges across four EU instruments, 31 jurisdictions, 61 regulator/FIU nodes and eight AMLA standards at the 2026-05-07 cut-off.

- Source: https://finray.tech/intelligence/amlr-amla-implementation-tracker/
- Cluster: Authority
- Published: 2026-05-07
- Updated: 2026-05-07
- Publisher: Finray Technologies Ltd, Cyprus Companies Registry HE 445903
- Editorial principle: primary sources only; conflicts of interest disclosed inline

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The AMLR/AMLA implementation pathway tracker maps the supervisory perimeter, not the regulated population. Every node on the canvas is a regulator, a jurisdiction, a binding EU instrument, a status anchor, or an AMLA-issued standard; no private bank, crypto-asset service provider, casino, trust-and-company-service provider, or professional-services firm is scored or ranked. The graph is deliberately evidence-led: a national supervisor receives a transposition/readiness status only where the status can be tied to a regulator-side, ministry-side, parliamentary, gazette, or EUR-Lex primary source at the 2026-05-07 cut-off. Where that threshold is not met, the node is marked `needs-verification`, not guessed from silence. AMLA itself is mapped as the central EU authority under [Regulation (EU) 2024/1620](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1620/oj/eng) (accessed 2026-05-07), and the national supervisor/FIU nodes are mapped only to show the route through which AMLR, AMLD6 and TFR obligations will be supervised. This is a regulator-tracker, not a forensic register or a league table.

The architecture is four instruments, not one reform label. [AMLR — Regulation (EU) 2024/1624](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1624/oj/eng) (accessed 2026-05-07) is the directly applicable single rulebook for obliged entities and applies from 10 July 2027 for the core framework. [AMLD6 — Directive (EU) 2024/1640](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1640/oj/eng) (accessed 2026-05-07) requires Member States to build the national supervisory, FIU, beneficial-ownership and cooperation machinery that surrounds the directly applicable Regulation, with the main transposition deadline aligned to 10 July 2027. [The AMLA Regulation — Regulation (EU) 2024/1620](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1620/oj/eng) (accessed 2026-05-07) created the Anti-Money Laundering Authority, in force from 26 June 2024, and provides the legal route to direct AMLA supervision from 1 January 2028. [TFR — Regulation (EU) 2023/1113](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/1113/oj/eng) (accessed 2026-05-07) is already in application for the transfer-of-funds and crypto-asset “travel rule” perimeter. The graph therefore separates directly applicable obligations, national transposition work, EU-level institutional build-out and transfer-data controls instead of flattening them into one “AML package” label.

AMLA’s institutional build-out is encoded as a central EU-authority node, not as a national status class. The Council and Parliament selected Frankfurt am Main as AMLA’s seat on 22 February 2024, and AMLA’s public site identifies the authority at MesseTurm, Frankfurt ([Council seat decision](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/02/22/frankfurt-to-host-the-eus-new-anti-money-laundering-authority-amla/) (accessed 2026-05-07) and [AMLA home](https://www.amla.europa.eu/) (accessed 2026-05-07)). AMLA’s governance page records that the Council appointed Bruna Szego as Chair on 21 January 2025 and that she joined AMLA on 17 February 2025; it also describes an Executive Board composed of the Chair and five full-time members, plus a General Board that meets in supervisory and FIU compositions ([AMLA governance](https://www.amla.europa.eu/about-amla/governance_en) (accessed 2026-05-07)). The public timeline shows 2026 ramp-up, 40 obliged entities selected during 2027, and direct supervision starting in 2028 ([AMLA about](https://www.amla.europa.eu/about-amla_en) (accessed 2026-05-07)). AMLA’s January 2026 data-collection notice says its risk models will inform the 2027 selection of up to 40 entities or groups for direct supervision from 2028 ([AMLA data-collection notice](https://www.amla.europa.eu/amla-launch-data-collection-exercise-test-risk-assessment-models-financial-sector_en) (accessed 2026-05-07)).

The graph distinguishes the two supervisory tiers that matter under the new regime. The first tier is direct AMLA supervision: AMLA’s own explainer says that, from 2028, it will directly supervise up to 40 of the most impactful financial institutions or groups operating in the EU, selected on residual-risk and significant-presence criteria ([AMLA direct-supervision explainer](https://www.amla.europa.eu/document/download/5aa923cc-eece-4cff-a9dd-4f687e88962b_en?filename=Explainer+-+Direct+Supervision+by+AMLA.pdf) (accessed 2026-05-07)). The second tier is indirect supervision: all other obliged entities remain under national supervisors, while AMLA coordinates convergence, risk methodology, data collection, colleges and supervisory-system cooperation. The tracker therefore draws edges between AMLA and each national NCA/FIU, but it does not create entity-level nodes. At the cut-off, AMLA had not published the first direct-supervision selection list; the January 2026 notice instead says AMLA will establish the final eligible list after model testing and national-supervisor data collection in early 2027 ([AMLA data-collection notice](https://www.amla.europa.eu/amla-launch-data-collection-exercise-test-risk-assessment-models-financial-sector_en) (accessed 2026-05-07)). The reserved `direct-supervision-selected` status-class is therefore not populated.

The selection methodology that produces the 40 directly-supervised institutions has a public methodology layer and a confidential application layer. AMLA’s regulatory instruments page lists the draft Regulatory Technical Standard on the methodology for selection criteria — defining what “significant presence” and residual ML/TF risk mean operationally — alongside the draft ITS that scaffolds the application of those criteria across the supervisory system ([AMLA regulatory instruments](https://www.amla.europa.eu/policy/regulatory-instruments_en) (accessed 2026-05-07)). The supervisor-side input is the institution-level inherent-risk, mitigating-control-quality and residual-risk score that each NCA will supply to AMLA’s risk-assessment models, tested against quantitative thresholds for cross-border activity, asset volume and product mix; the January 2026 data-collection notice is the model-test exercise that calibrates those thresholds before live use, and AMLA’s notice says it will establish the final eligible list after national-supervisor data collection in early 2027 ([AMLA data-collection notice](https://www.amla.europa.eu/amla-launch-data-collection-exercise-test-risk-assessment-models-financial-sector_en) (accessed 2026-05-07)). The output of the selection model is the institution-level eligible list; the final 40 are drawn from that list against the significant-presence criterion under AMLA Regulation Article 12. Until that list is published, the conservative editorial position is that no entity, group or jurisdiction can be inferred to be inside or outside the perimeter from public commentary alone, and the reserved `direct-supervision-selected` status-class stays empty by design.

The transposition layer is intentionally conservative. The v1 graph encodes `transposition-bill-published` for Germany, France and the Netherlands, and `transposition-consultation-open` for Spain; all other EU/EEA national supervisor and FIU nodes are `needs-verification` until a regulator-side, ministry-side, parliamentary or gazette source is tied to the exact AMLD6 implementation status. Germany is classified on Bundestag Drucksache 21/2507, whose explanatory schedule says Article 51 amending the German Money Laundering Act serves, among other things, to implement Directive (EU) 2024/1640 ([Bundestag Drucksache 21/2507](https://dserver.bundestag.de/btd/21/025/2102507.pdf) (accessed 2026-05-07)). France is classified on the Senate legislative report and Assembly bill record: the Senate perimeter lists transposition of Directive (EU) 2024/1640 and adaptation to Regulations (EU) 2024/1624 and 2024/1620, while the Assembly page records the bill deposited on 20 February 2026 ([Sénat report](https://www.senat.fr/rap/l25-347/l25-3479.html) (accessed 2026-05-07) and [Assemblée nationale bill](https://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/dyn/17/textes/l17b2518_projet-loi) (accessed 2026-05-07)). The Netherlands is classified on the official internet consultation for the Implementatiewet ter voorkoming van witwassen en terrorismefinanciering, which states that the Iwt implements Directive (EU) 2024/1640 and replaces the Wwft ([Dutch consultation](https://www.internetconsultatie.nl/implementatiewettervoorkomingvanwitwassenenterrorismefinanciering/b1) (accessed 2026-05-07)). Spain is classified on the Treasury public consultation for transposition of Directive (EU) 2024/1640 ([Tesoro consultation](https://tesoro.es/consulta-publica-de-la-transposicion-de-la-directiva-ue-20241640-del-pe-y-del-consejo-de-31-de-mayo) (accessed 2026-05-07)). No node is put into `transposition-adopted` or `transposition-not-started` in v1, because full adoption and source-cited absence were not established across the 30 jurisdictions.

Gold-plating is kept out of the status axis and appears only as a tag. The graph marks Belgium, France, Spain and the Netherlands with `gold-plating-signalled` because a primary source indicates a cash-payment restriction below the AMLR cash ceiling or a proposed national cash rule below that ceiling. Belgium’s FPS Economy page states that, outside listed exceptions, payment or acceptance of one or more linked debts cannot exceed EUR 3,000 in cash ([FPS Economy Belgium](https://economie.fgov.be/fr/themes/services-financiers/lutte-contre-le-blanchiment-de) (accessed 2026-05-07)). France’s Service Public page states that cash payments from an individual to a professional, or between professionals, are limited to EUR 1,000, with higher limits for certain non-residents ([Service Public France](https://www.service-public.gouv.fr/particuliers/vosdroits/F10999) (accessed 2026-05-07)). Spain’s Tax Agency page states that operations where one party acts as entrepreneur or professional may not be paid in cash at EUR 1,000 or above, subject to a EUR 10,000 non-resident exception ([Agencia Tributaria](https://sede.agenciatributaria.gob.es/Sede/colaborar-agencia-tributaria/denuncias/denuncia-pagos-efectivo.html) (accessed 2026-05-07)). The Dutch consultation says the new implementation package includes a prohibition on cash payments above EUR 3,000 for goods and services, and notes that a law for goods had already passed the Senate for effect from 1 January 2026 ([Dutch consultation](https://www.internetconsultatie.nl/implementatiewettervoorkomingvanwitwassenenterrorismefinanciering/b1) (accessed 2026-05-07)). The tracker does not infer expanded obliged-entity perimeters or sectoral coverage from commentary; those tags require the same primary-source threshold.

The crypto-asset dimension sits at the intersection of TFR, AMLR and MiCA. TFR supplies the transfer-data obligation for payment service providers and crypto-asset service providers, and the EBA’s travel-rule Guidelines specify the steps PSPs, intermediary PSPs, CASPs and intermediary CASPs should take to detect missing or incomplete transfer information, with an application date of 30 December 2024 ([EBA travel-rule Guidelines page](https://www.eba.europa.eu/activities/single-rulebook/regulatory-activities/anti-money-laundering-and-countering-financing-terrorism/guidelines-information-requirements-relation-transfers-funds-and-certain-crypto-assets-transfers) (accessed 2026-05-07)). AMLR supplies the broader obliged-entity AML/CFT perimeter for CASPs under the single rulebook ([AMLR](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1624/oj/eng) (accessed 2026-05-07)). ESMA’s MiCA transfer-services Guidelines sit next to, not inside, this AML graph, because they address crypto-asset transfer services under MiCA rather than AMLD6 transposition status ([ESMA MiCA transfer-services Guidelines](https://www.esma.europa.eu/document/guidelines-transfer-services-crypto-assets-under-mica) (accessed 2026-05-07)). AMLA had public draft or final standards on CDD, business relationships, sanctions, direct-supervision cooperation, risk-profile methodology, selection methodology, group-wide requirements and business-wide risk assessment at the cut-off, but no AMLA-issued CASP-specific RTS was encoded as a separate node unless it was published on AMLA’s own regulatory-products or consultation pages ([AMLA regulatory instruments](https://www.amla.europa.eu/policy/regulatory-instruments_en) (accessed 2026-05-07)).

The supervisory cohort that holds the AMLR perimeter for crypto-asset service providers from 10 July 2027 is the same cohort that holds MiCA authorisation today. Under TFR Articles 14 and 15, every CASP must include originator and beneficiary information with each transfer, and intermediary CASPs must verify message integrity ([TFR](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/1113/oj/eng) (accessed 2026-05-07)). Under AMLR, CASPs are listed as obliged entities subject to the full single-rulebook AML/CFT regime and to the EBA travel-rule Guidelines that apply since 30 December 2024. Under the MiCA Regulation, CASPs are authorised for the conduct-of-business and prudential perimeter, and the authorisation process explicitly requires the competent authority to assess AML/CFT risk in the application ([MiCA](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/1114/oj/eng) (accessed 2026-05-07)). The same authority therefore carries the AML/CFT mandate from 10 July 2027 onward: BaFin in Germany, AFM in the Netherlands, ACPR and AMF in France, CSSF in Luxembourg, MFSA in Malta, CySEC in Cyprus, Banca d’Italia in Italy, CNMV in Spain and a number of smaller-market authorities. Each is tagged `crypto-supervisor` in the graph where its public website documents the CASP authorisation regime; the tag is structural, not a quality judgement.

The Financial Intelligence Unit perimeter is the reform’s other operational backbone, and AMLD6 is the directive layer that pairs with AMLR’s directly applicable obliged-entity duties. AMLD6 consolidates the Member State obligations on FIU establishment, autonomy, secure information-sharing channels, beneficial-ownership-register access and cross-border cooperation that previously sat across AMLD4 and AMLD5 ([AMLD6](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1640/oj/eng) (accessed 2026-05-07)). The AMLA Regulation establishes a permanent FIU Support and Coordination Mechanism within AMLA, distinct from the supervisory-system cooperation tooling, and the AMLA General Board has separate supervisory and FIU compositions so that the two mandates do not bleed into each other at governance level ([AMLA governance](https://www.amla.europa.eu/about-amla/governance_en) (accessed 2026-05-07)). FIU-to-FIU information exchange runs over secure EU channels and, for cases beyond EU borders, through Egmont Group membership; the graph carries the `fiu-egmont-member` tag on every regulator node where the public supervisor-side or FIU-side page identifies the institution as an Egmont member at the cut-off. Where Egmont membership is recorded by the FIU itself but not yet sourced to a primary page in this iteration, the regulator stays at `needs-verification` for that tag rather than carrying it speculatively.

Cross-border supervision is represented through standard nodes and complementary-to edges rather than by inventing private-sector group nodes. AMLA’s Regulatory Instruments page says it develops RTS, ITS, Guidelines and Recommendations to promote convergence and consistency in the EU AML/CFT framework, and lists the public instruments that had reached consultation, closed consultation or final-report stage by the cut-off ([AMLA regulatory instruments](https://www.amla.europa.eu/policy/regulatory-instruments_en) (accessed 2026-05-07)). The group-wide consultation says the draft RTS under AMLR Articles 16(4) and 17(3) set minimum standards for group-wide AML/CFT frameworks, including cross-border situations and third-country operations ([AMLA group-wide consultation notice](https://www.amla.europa.eu/amla-consults-group-wide-requirements-and-business-wide-risk-assessment_en) (accessed 2026-05-07)). The draft ITS under AMLA Regulation Article 15(3) covers cooperation within the AML/CFT supervisory system for direct supervision, while the final-report RTS under AMLD6 Article 40(2) defines a common methodology for supervisors to assess inherent and residual ML/TF risk profiles ([AMLA ITS consultation](https://www.amla.europa.eu/policy/public-consultations/consultation-draft-its-under-art-153-amlar_en) (accessed 2026-05-07) and [AMLA risk-profile RTS final report](https://www.amla.europa.eu/document/download/c8782141-45bf-4ef9-9d66-33e2f90e607e_en?filename=1.1_20251216_FINAL+REPORT+RTS+40%282%29+AMLD+financial+only_Final.pdf) (accessed 2026-05-07)). This is where cross-border colleges and Joint Supervisory Team operating detail belongs in the graph: as supervisor-to-supervisor coordination and AMLA standards, not as a list of supervised groups.

Beneficial-ownership transparency is the third pillar of the reform, and it sits inside AMLD6 rather than AMLR because the implementation depends on Member State register architecture. AMLD6 obliges Member States to maintain beneficial-ownership registers for legal entities and legal arrangements, with regulated access tiered between competent authorities, obliged entities for customer-due-diligence purposes, and persons or organisations demonstrating a legitimate interest ([AMLD6](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1640/oj/eng) (accessed 2026-05-07)). The Beneficial Ownership Registers Interconnection System (BORIS) — the EU central platform that connects national beneficial-ownership registers — pre-dates AMLD6 but is reformed by it, including following the November 2022 Court of Justice judgment in Joined Cases C-37/20 and C-601/20 (WM and Sovim), which struck down the previous unrestricted public-access provision in AMLD5 and required the access architecture to move to the legitimate-interest regime that AMLD6 now codifies. BORIS is not encoded as a node in the graph because BORIS is an interconnection platform rather than a regulator with its own supervisory mandate; instead, beneficial-ownership-register operation is treated as part of the national supervisory machinery captured by the `located-in` regulator nodes. The transposition status classifications above therefore encompass both the AML/CFT supervisory machinery and the beneficial-ownership-register reform; at NCA level the two cannot be disentangled, and a regulator that has published a transposition bill has implicitly published the beneficial-ownership-register adjustments alongside it.

The United Kingdom is shown only as a comparator paragraph and is not encoded in the graph. The UK post-Brexit AML perimeter remains based on the Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Transfer of Funds (Information on the Payer) Regulations 2017 and subsequent amendments such as the 2024 high-risk-country amendment ([UK MLR 2017](https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2017/692) (accessed 2026-05-07) and [UK MLR 2024 amendment](https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2024/69/made) (accessed 2026-05-07)). UK supervision is split across the FCA financial-crime perimeter, HMRC-supervised sectors and the Gambling Commission’s AML responsibilities, with JMLSG guidance providing industry-facing interpretive material ([FCA financial crime](https://www.fca.org.uk/firms/financial-crime) (accessed 2026-05-07), [HMRC AML supervision](https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/anti-money-laundering-supervision-detailed-information) (accessed 2026-05-07), [Gambling Commission AML](https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/aml) (accessed 2026-05-07), and [JMLSG current guidance](https://www.jmlsg.org.uk/guidance/current-guidance/) (accessed 2026-05-07)). FATF’s UK country page at the cut-off still presented the 2018 mutual evaluation and 2022 follow-up material, not a separate UK 2026 mutual-evaluation result, so the tracker does not fabricate one ([FATF United Kingdom country page](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/countries/detail/united-kingdom.html) (accessed 2026-05-07)). UK firms operating through EU subsidiaries should read this tracker as an EU-supervisor pathway map, not as a substitute for UK MLR compliance analysis.

Read the graph from the centre outward. The four red diamonds are the binding EU instruments; the amber standard nodes are only AMLA-issued RTS, ITS or Guidelines that had a public AMLA page or AMLA final-report document at the cut-off; the teal hexagons are AMLA, national supervisors and FIUs; and the orange diamonds are status anchors. `needs-verification` does not mean “no action”: it means the first evidence pass did not tie a status claim to the required primary source, so the conservative answer is to hold the node until the next refresh. The tracker is designed for quarterly refresh plus signal-event refreshes: AMLA standard adoptions, national transposition bills, gazette publication, supervisor restructuring, and the future first direct-supervision selection list. No recusal applies: Authority cluster artefact. Finray Technologies Ltd does not ship a product that competes with regulators.

[^de-bill]: Translation note: Bundestag Drucksache 21/2507 states that Article 51 amending the Geldwäschegesetz serves, among other things, to implement Directive (EU) 2024/1640.
[^fr-bill]: Translation note: the Senate legislative report lists the transposition of Directive (EU) 2024/1640 and adaptation to Regulations (EU) 2024/1624 and 2024/1620 within the bill perimeter.
[^nl-consultation]: Translation note: the Dutch consultation states that the Implementatiewet ter voorkoming van witwassen en terrorismefinanciering implements Directive (EU) 2024/1640 and that the current Wwft will be replaced.
[^es-consultation]: Translation note: the Spanish Treasury source is the public consultation for transposition of Directive (EU) 2024/1640 of the European Parliament and Council.

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## Reference index

### Regulators (61)

- **Anti-Money Laundering Authority** — https://www.amla.europa.eu/ — EU central authority for AML/CFT supervision; direct supervisor of selected obliged entities from 1 January 2028.
- **Austrian Financial Market Authority** — https://www.fma.gv.at/en/cross-sectoral-topics/prevention-of-money-laundering-terrorist-financing/ — Austrian financial-market supervisor; supervises AML/CFT compliance by financial institutions.
- **Austrian Financial Intelligence Unit** — https://bundeskriminalamt.at/202/Geldwaeschemeldestelle/start.aspx — Austrian FIU; receives and analyses suspicious transaction reports and disseminates intelligence to competent authorities.
- **National Bank of Belgium** — https://www.nbb.be/en/financial-oversight/anti-money-laundering-and-counter-terrorist-financing — Belgian central bank and financial supervisor; AML/CFT supervisor for regulated financial institutions.
- **Financial Intelligence Processing Unit (CTIF-CFI)** — https://www.ctif-cfi.be/ — Belgian FIU; analyses suspicious financial information and transmits cases to prosecutors when appropriate.
- **Bulgarian National Bank** — https://www.bnb.bg/BankSupervision/BSAntiMoneyLaundering/index.htm?toLang=_EN — Bulgarian central bank; supervises bank AML/CFT obligations and prudential financial-sector controls.
- **Financial Intelligence Directorate of the State Agency for National Security** — https://www.dans.bg/en/activities/financial-intelligence — Bulgarian FIU; receives and analyses suspicious transaction information for AML/CFT purposes.
- **Croatian National Bank** — https://www.hnb.hr/en/core-functions/supervision/anti-money-laundering-and-terrorist-financing — Croatian central bank; supervises AML/CFT compliance in the banking and financial sector.
- **Anti-Money Laundering Office** — https://mfin.gov.hr/en/anti-money-laundering-office/427 — Croatian FIU; receives, analyses and disseminates suspicious transaction reports.
- **Central Bank of Cyprus** — https://www.centralbank.cy/en/licensing-supervision/supervision/compliance/anti-money-laundering — Cypriot central bank; supervises AML/CFT obligations of credit institutions and other regulated financial firms.
- **Unit for Combating Money Laundering (MOKAS)** — http://www.law.gov.cy/law/mokas/mokas.nsf/index_en/index_en?OpenDocument — Cypriot FIU; receives, analyses and disseminates suspicious transaction reports.
- **Czech National Bank** — https://www.cnb.cz/en/supervision-financial-market/anti-money-laundering-and-counter-terrorist-financing/ — Czech central bank and financial supervisor; supervises AML/CFT compliance by financial-market entities.
- **Financial Analytical Office** — https://fau.gov.cz/en — Czech FIU; receives and analyses suspicious transaction reports and coordinates AML financial intelligence.
- **Danish Financial Supervisory Authority** — https://www.dfsa.dk/Supervision/Aml — Danish financial supervisor; supervises AML/CFT compliance in the regulated financial sector.
- **Money Laundering Secretariat** — https://politi.dk/en/special-crime-unit/money-laundering-secretariat — Danish FIU; receives suspicious transaction reports and supports law-enforcement AML analysis.
- **Finantsinspektsioon** — https://www.fi.ee/en/supervision/anti-money-laundering-and-countering-financing-terrorism — Estonian financial supervisor; supervises AML/CFT compliance by financial institutions.
- **Estonian Financial Intelligence Unit** — https://fiu.ee/en — Estonian FIU; receives and analyses suspicious transaction reports and supervises some AML obligations.
- **Finnish Financial Supervisory Authority** — https://www.finanssivalvonta.fi/en/prevention-of-money-laundering-and-terrorist-financing/ — Finnish financial supervisor; supervises AML/CFT compliance in the financial sector.
- **Finnish Financial Intelligence Unit** — https://poliisi.fi/en/finnish-financial-intelligence-unit — Finnish FIU; receives and analyses suspicious transaction reports within the National Bureau of Investigation.
- **Autorité de contrôle prudentiel et de résolution** — https://acpr.banque-france.fr/en/authorisation/supervision-and-controls/anti-money-laundering-and-countering-financing-terrorism — French prudential supervisor; supervises AML/CFT compliance by banking and insurance firms.
- **TRACFIN** — https://www.economie.gouv.fr/tracfin — French FIU; receives, analyses and disseminates suspicious transaction reports.
- **Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin)** — https://www.bafin.de/EN/Aufsicht/Geldwaeschebekaempfung/geldwaeschebekaempfung_node_en.html — German federal financial supervisor; AML/CFT competent authority for credit and financial institutions.
- **Financial Intelligence Unit Germany** — https://www.zoll.de/EN/FIU/fiu_node.html — German FIU; receives and analyses suspicious transaction reports within the General Customs Directorate.
- **Bank of Greece** — https://www.bankofgreece.gr/en/main-tasks/supervision/anti-money-laundering-and-combating-the-financing-of-terrorism — Greek central bank; supervises AML/CFT compliance by credit and financial institutions.
- **Hellenic Financial Intelligence Unit** — https://www.hellenic-fiu.gr/en/ — Greek FIU; receives, analyses and disseminates suspicious activity information.
- **Magyar Nemzeti Bank** — https://www.mnb.hu/en/supervision/supervisory-framework/anti-money-laundering — Hungarian central bank and financial supervisor; supervises financial-sector AML/CFT compliance.
- **Hungarian Financial Intelligence Unit** — https://pei.nav.gov.hu/ — Hungarian FIU; receives and analyses suspicious transaction reports within the tax and customs administration.
- **Central Bank of Ireland** — https://www.centralbank.ie/regulation/anti-money-laundering-and-countering-the-financing-of-terrorism — Irish central bank and financial supervisor; supervises AML/CFT compliance by regulated financial-service providers.
- **Garda Financial Intelligence Unit** — https://www.garda.ie/en/about-us/organised-serious-crime/garda-national-economic-crime-bureau/financial-intelligence-unit/ — Irish FIU; receives and analyses suspicious transaction reports within An Garda Síochána.
- **Bank of Italy** — https://www.bancaditalia.it/compiti/vigilanza/antiriciclaggio/ — Italian central bank; supervises AML/CFT compliance by banks and financial intermediaries.
- **Financial Intelligence Unit for Italy** — https://uif.bancaditalia.it — Italian FIU; receives, analyses and disseminates suspicious transaction reports within the Bank of Italy.
- **Latvijas Banka** — https://www.bank.lv/en/operational-areas/supervision/anti-money-laundering-and-combating-terrorist-and-proliferation-financing — Latvian central bank and financial supervisor; supervises AML/CFT compliance in the financial sector.
- **Financial Intelligence Unit of Latvia** — https://www.fid.gov.lv/en — Latvian FIU; receives and analyses suspicious transaction reports and disseminates financial intelligence.
- **Bank of Lithuania** — https://www.lb.lt/en/money-laundering-and-terrorist-financing-prevention — Lithuanian central bank and financial supervisor; supervises financial-sector AML/CFT compliance.
- **Financial Crime Investigation Service** — https://fntt.lrv.lt/en/ — Lithuanian FIU; receives and analyses suspicious transactions and investigates financial crime.
- **Commission de Surveillance du Secteur Financier** — https://www.cssf.lu/en/aml-cft/ — Luxembourg financial-sector supervisor; supervises AML/CFT compliance by financial professionals.
- **Cellule de renseignement financier** — https://justice.public.lu/fr/organisation-justice/crf.html — Luxembourg FIU; receives and analyses suspicious transaction reports for prosecution authorities.
- **Malta Financial Services Authority** — https://www.mfsa.mt/firms/anti-money-laundering/ — Maltese financial supervisor; supervises financial-sector AML/CFT compliance alongside the FIAU.
- **Financial Intelligence Analysis Unit** — https://fiaumalta.org/ — Maltese FIU; receives, analyses and disseminates suspicious transaction reports and performs AML supervision.
- **De Nederlandsche Bank** — https://www.dnb.nl/en/sector-information/supervision-laws-and-regulations/laws-and-eu-regulations/anti-money-laundering-and-anti-terrorist-financing-act/ — Dutch central bank and financial supervisor; supervises AML/CFT compliance by financial institutions.
- **FIU-Netherlands** — https://www.fiu-nederland.nl/en/ — Dutch FIU; receives unusual transaction reports and declares suspicious transactions for law enforcement.
- **Polish Financial Supervision Authority** — https://www.knf.gov.pl/en/SUPERVISION/Anti_money_laundering_and_countering_terrorist_financing — Polish financial supervisor; supervises AML/CFT controls in regulated financial institutions.
- **General Inspector of Financial Information** — https://www.gov.pl/web/finance/general-inspector-of-financial-information — Polish FIU; receives, analyses and disseminates suspicious transaction reports.
- **Banco de Portugal** — https://www.bportugal.pt/en/page/money-laundering-and-terrorist-financing — Portuguese central bank; supervises AML/CFT compliance by credit institutions and financial companies.
- **Financial Intelligence Unit Portugal** — https://www.policiajudiciaria.pt/unc3t-english/ — Portuguese FIU; receives and analyses suspicious transaction reports within the Polícia Judiciária.
- **National Bank of Romania** — https://www.bnro.ro/Preventing-and-combating-money-laundering-and-terrorist-financing-19512.aspx — Romanian central bank; supervises AML/CFT compliance by credit institutions and other financial entities.
- **National Office for Prevention and Control of Money Laundering** — https://www.onpcsb.ro/en — Romanian FIU; receives and analyses suspicious transaction reports and coordinates AML intelligence.
- **National Bank of Slovakia** — https://nbs.sk/en/financial-market-supervision1/anti-money-laundering-and-counter-terrorist-financing/ — Slovak central bank and financial supervisor; supervises AML/CFT compliance by financial-market entities.
- **Financial Intelligence Unit Slovakia** — https://www.minv.sk/?financial-intelligence-unit — Slovak FIU; receives and analyses suspicious transaction reports within the Ministry of Interior.
- **Bank of Slovenia** — https://www.bsi.si/en/financial-stability/anti-money-laundering-and-terrorist-financing-prevention — Slovenian central bank; supervises AML/CFT compliance by banks and financial institutions.
- **Office for Money Laundering Prevention** — https://www.gov.si/en/state-authorities/bodies-within-ministries/office-for-money-laundering-prevention/ — Slovenian FIU; receives and analyses suspicious transaction reports and coordinates AML prevention.
- **Banco de España** — https://www.bde.es/wbe/en/areas-actuacion/supervision/prevention-money-laundering/ — Spanish central bank; supervises AML/CFT compliance by credit institutions and other supervised entities.
- **Executive Service of the Commission for the Prevention of Money Laundering and Monetary Offences (Sepblac)** — https://www.sepblac.es/en/ — Spanish FIU and AML supervisory service; receives, analyses and disseminates suspicious transaction reports.
- **Finansinspektionen** — https://www.fi.se/en/anti-money-laundering/ — Swedish financial supervisor; supervises AML/CFT compliance by regulated financial institutions.
- **Swedish Financial Intelligence Unit** — https://polisen.se/en/about-the-police/police-work/financial-intelligence-unit/ — Swedish FIU; receives and analyses suspicious transaction reports within the Police Authority.
- **Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway** — https://www.finanstilsynet.no/en/topics/anti-money-laundering/ — Norwegian financial supervisor; supervises AML/CFT compliance in the financial sector under EEA-aligned law.
- **Norwegian Financial Intelligence Unit** — https://www.okokrim.no/financial-intelligence-unit.424377.en.html — Norwegian FIU; receives and analyses suspicious transaction reports within Økokrim.
- **Central Bank of Iceland** — https://www.cb.is/financial-supervision/anti-money-laundering/ — Icelandic central bank and financial supervisor; supervises AML/CFT compliance in the financial sector.
- **Icelandic Financial Intelligence Unit** — https://www.logreglan.is/english/ — Icelandic FIU; receives and analyses suspicious transaction reports for AML/CFT purposes.
- **Financial Market Authority Liechtenstein** — https://www.fma-li.li/en/supervision/prevention-of-money-laundering.html — Liechtenstein financial-market supervisor; supervises AML/CFT compliance by financial intermediaries.
- **Financial Intelligence Unit Liechtenstein** — https://www.fiu.li/en/ — Liechtenstein FIU; receives and analyses suspicious transaction reports and disseminates intelligence.

### Regulations (4)

- **AMLR (EU) 2024/1624** — https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1624/oj/eng — EU AML/CFT Regulation directly applicable from 10 July 2027.
- **AMLD6 (EU) 2024/1640** — https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1640/oj/eng — EU AML/CFT Directive requiring national transposition by 10 July 2027 for most provisions.
- **AMLA Regulation (EU) 2024/1620** — https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1620/oj/eng — Establishes AMLA and its direct and indirect supervisory coordination functions.
- **TFR (EU) 2023/1113** — https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/1113/oj/eng — Transfer of Funds Regulation applying information requirements to funds and crypto-asset transfers.

### Standards (8)

- **RTS on Customer Due Diligence** — https://www.amla.europa.eu/policy/public-consultations/consultation-draft-rts-customer-due-diligence_en — AMLR Art. 28(1) RTS specifying information and requirements for customer due diligence.
- **RTS on business relationships, occasional and linked transactions** — https://www.amla.europa.eu/policy/public-consultations/consultation-draft-rts-criteria-identifying-business-relationships-occasional-and-linked_en — AMLR Art. 19(9) RTS defining criteria for business relationships, occasional transactions, linked transactions and lower thresholds.
- **RTS on pecuniary sanctions and supervisory measures** — https://www.amla.europa.eu/policy/public-consultations/consultation-draft-rts-pecuniary-sanctions-administrative-measures-and-periodic-penalty-payments_en — AMLD6 Art. 53(10) RTS specifying gravity criteria, sanction factors and periodic penalty methodology.
- **ITS on cooperation for AMLA direct supervision** — https://www.amla.europa.eu/policy/public-consultations/consultation-draft-its-under-art-153-amlar_en — AMLA Regulation Art. 15(3) ITS specifying cooperation inside the AML/CFT supervisory system for direct supervision.
- **RTS on inherent and residual risk-profile assessment** — https://www.amla.europa.eu/document/download/c8782141-45bf-4ef9-9d66-33e2f90e607e_en?filename=1.1_20251216_FINAL+REPORT+RTS+40%282%29+AMLD+financial+only_Final.pdf — AMLD6 Art. 40(2) RTS setting common methodology for supervisors to assess obliged-entity ML/TF risk profiles.
- **RTS on direct-supervision selection methodology** — https://www.amla.europa.eu/document/download/1c8bca18-fb5e-4b5e-afee-848111754238_en?filename=2.1_20251216_Final+report+-+RTS+under+art.+12%287%29+AMLAR.pdf — AMLA Regulation Art. 12(7) RTS for selecting directly supervised credit and financial institutions or groups.
- **RTS on group-wide AML/CFT requirements** — https://www.amla.europa.eu/amla-consults-group-wide-requirements-and-business-wide-risk-assessment_en — AMLR Arts. 16(4) and 17(3) RTS setting minimum standards for group-wide frameworks and third-country branches/subsidiaries.
- **Guidelines on business-wide risk assessment** — https://www.amla.europa.eu/policy/public-consultations/consultation-draft-guidelines-business-wide-risk-assessment_en — AMLR Art. 10(4) Guidelines setting minimum expectations for obliged entities business-wide risk assessment.